Tag Archives: coordination game

Defence against bullying

Humans are social animals. For evolutionary reasons, they feel bad when their social group excludes, bullies or opposes them. Physical bullying and theft or vandalism of possessions have real consequences and cannot be countered purely in the mind. However, the real consequences are usually provable to the authorities, which makes it easier to punish the bullies and demand compensation. Psychological reasons may prevent the victim from asking the authorities to help. Verbal bullying has an effect only via psychology, because vibrations of air from the larynx or written symbols cannot hurt a human physically.

One psychological defense is diversification of group memberships. The goal is to prevent exclusion from most of one’s social network. If a person belongs to only one group in society, then losing the support of its members feels very significant. Being part of many circles means that exclusion from one group can be immediately compensated by spending more time in others.

Bullies instinctively understand that their victims can strengthen themselves by diversifying their connections, so bullies try to cut a victim’s other social ties. The beaters of family members forbid their family from having other friends or going to social events. School bullies mock a victim’s friends to drive them away and weaken the victim’s connection to them. Dictators create paranoia against foreigners, accusing them of spying and sabotage.

When a person has already been excluded from most of their social network, joining new groups or lobbying for readmission to old ones may be hard. People prefer to interact with those who display positive emotions. The negative emotions caused by a feeling of abandonment make it difficult to present a happy and fun image to others. Also, if the „admission committee” knows that a candidate to join their group has no other options, then they are likely to be more demanding, in terms of requiring favours or conformity to the group norms. Bargaining power depends on what each side gets when the negotiations break down – the better the outside option, the stronger the bargaining position. It is thus helpful to prepare for potential future exclusion in advance by joining many groups. Diversifying one’s memberships before the alternative groups become necessary is insurance. One should keep one’s options open, which argues for living in a bigger city, exploring different cultures both online and the real world, and not burning bridges with people who at some point excluded or otherwise acted against one.

There may be a case for forgiving bullies if they take enough nice actions to compensate. Apologetic words alone do not cancel actions, as discussed elsewhere (http://sanderheinsalu.com/ajaveeb/?p=556). Forgiving does not mean forgetting, because past behaviour is informative about future actions, and social interactions are a dynamic game. The entire sharing economy (carsharing, home-renting) is made possible by having people’s reputations follow them even if they try to escape the consequences of their past deeds. The difficulty of evading consequences motivates better behaviour. The same holds in social interactions. In the long run, it is better for everyone, except perhaps the worst people, if past deeds are rewarded or punished as they deserve. If bullying is not punished, then the perpetrators learn this and intensify their oppression in the future.

Of course, the bullies may try to punish those who reported them to the authorities. The threat to retaliate against whistleblowers shows fear of punishment, because people who do not care about the consequences would not bother threatening. The whistleblower can in turn threaten the bullies with reporting to the authorities if the bullies punish the original whistleblowing. The bullies can threaten to punish this second report, and the whistleblower threaten to punish the bullies’ second retaliation, etc. The bullying and reporting is a repeated interaction and has multiple equilibria. One equilibrium is that the bullies rule, therefore nobody dares to report them, and due to not being reported, they continue to rule. Another equilibrium is that any bullying is swiftly reported and punished, so the bullies do not even dare to start the bullying-reporting-retaliation cycle. The bullies rationally try to push the interaction towards the equilibrium where they rule. Victims and goodhearted bystanders should realise this and work towards the other equilibrium by immediately reporting any bullying against anyone, not just oneself.

To prevent insults from creating negative emotions, one should remember that the opinion of only a few other people at one point in time contains little information. Feedback is useful for improving oneself, and insults are a kind of feedback, but a more accurate measure of one’s capabilities is usually available. This takes the form of numerical performance indicators at work, studies, sports and various other tests in life. If people’s opinions are taken as feedback, then one should endeavour to survey a statistically meaningful sample of these opinions. The sample should be large and representative of society – the people surveyed should belong to many different groups.

If some people repeatedly insult one, then one should remember that the meaning of sounds or symbols that people produce (called language) is a social norm. If the society agrees on a different meaning for a given sound, then that sound starts to mean what the people agreed. Meaning is endogenous – it depends on how people choose to use language. On an individual level, if a person consistently mispronounces a word, then others learn what that unusual sound from that person means. Small groups can form their own slang, using words to denote meanings differently from the rest of society. Applying this insight to bullying, if others frequently use an insulting word to refer to a person, then that word starts to mean that person, not the negative thing that it originally meant. So one should not interpret an insulting word in a way that makes one feel bad. The actual meaning is neutral, just the „name” of a particular individual in the subgroup of bullies. Of course, in future interactions one should not forget the insulters’ attempt to make one feel bad.

To learn the real meaning of a word, as used by a specific person, one should Bayes update based on the connection of that person’s words and actions. This also helps in understanding politics. If transfers from the rich to the poor are called „help to the needy” by one party and „welfare” by another, then these phrases by the respective parties should be interpreted as „transfers from the rich to the poor”. If a politician frequently says the opposite of the truth, then his or her statements should be flipped (negation inserted) to derive their real meaning. Bayesian updating also explains why verbal apologies are usually nothing compared to actions.

Practicing acting in a drama club helps to understand that words often do not have content. Their effect is just in people’s minds. Mock confrontations in a play will train a person to handle real disputes.

Learning takes time and practice, including learning how to defend against bullying and ignore insults. Successfully resisting will train one to resist better. Dealing with adversity is sometimes called „building character”. To deliberately train oneself to ignore insults, one may organise an insult competition – if the insulted person reacts emotionally, then the insulter wins, otherwise the insulter loses. As with any training and competition, the difficulty level should be adjusted for ability and experience.

The current trend towards protecting children from even verbal bullying, and preventing undergraduate students from hearing statements that may distress them could backfire. If they are not trained to resist bullying and experience it at some point in their life, which seems likely, then they may be depressed for a long time or overreact to trivial insults. The analogy is living in an environment with too few microbes, which does not build immunity and causes allergy. „Safe spaces” and using only mild words are like disinfecting everything.

The bullies themselves are human, thus social animals, and feel negative emotions when excluded or ignored. If there are many victims and few bullies, then the victims should band together and exclude the bullies in turn. One force preventing this is that the victims see the bullies as the „cool kids” (attractive, rich, strong) and want their approval. The victims see other victims as „losers” or „outsiders” and help victimise them, and the other victims respond in kind. The outsiders do not understand that what counts as „cool” is often a social norm. If the majority thinks behaviour, clothing or slang A cool, then A is cool, but if the majority agrees on B, then B is preferred. The outsiders face a coordination game: if they could agree on a new social norm, then their number being larger than the number of insiders would spread the new norm. The outsiders would become the „cool kids” themselves, and the previously cool insiders would become the excluded outsiders.

Finding new friends helps increase the number who spread one’s preferred norms, as well as insuring against future exclusion by any subset of one’s acquaintances.

If there are many people to choose from when forming new connections, then the links should be chosen strategically. People imitate their peers, so choosing those with good habits as one’s friends helps one acquire these habits oneself. Having friends who exercise, study and have a good work ethic increases one’s future fitness, education and professional success. Criminal, smoking, racist friends nudge one towards similar behaviours and values. Choosing friends is thus a game with one’s future self. The goal is to direct the future self to a path preferred by the current self. The future self in turn directs its future selves. It takes time and effort to replace one’s friends, so there is a switching cost in one’s social network choice. A bad decision in the past may have an impact for a long time.

It may be difficult to determine who is a good person and who is not. Forming a social connection and subtly testing a person may be the only way to find out their true face. For example, telling them a fake secret and asking them not to tell anyone, then observing whether the information leaks. One should watch how one’s friends behave towards others, not just oneself. There is a tradeoff between learning about more people and interacting with only good people. The more connections one forms, the greater the likelihood that some are with bad people, but the more one learns. This is strategic experimentation in a dynamic environment.

Coordination game in choosing a university

The ranking of universities is very stable over time (http://m.chronicle.com/article/Rank-Delusions/189919) regardless of the difference in resources, scandals and other factors affecting popularity and quality. There are several positive feedback mechanisms keeping the rankings constant. These come from the multiple coordination games when choosing a university.
1) Smart and hardworking students want to be together with other smart and hard workers. If for some reason the best are in one location, then in the future all the best people have a motive to go to the same place. So the best arrive at that location and help attract other best people in the future. Similarly, party animals want to go to a university famous for its parties, and if many party animals come to a university, then it becomes famous for its parties.
Why would smart people want to be together with other intelligent folks? Just for interesting conversation, for useful contacts, collaboration. For these reasons, even the stupid may want to be together with the smart. Then an assortative matching results, as Gary Becker predicted for the marriage market (http://public.econ.duke.edu/~vjh3/e195S/readings/Becker_Assort_Mating.pdf).
2) Students want to go to a school with the best teaching staff, and the best professors want to teach the best students. I have yet to hear anyone wish for stupider students or teachers for themselves. Again the preference is the same among smarter and stupider students and professors, so assortative matching is a reasonable prediction.
3) The best professors want to be with other similar ones. Where there are such people, more will arrive.
4) Smarter graduates are likely to earn more and can donate more to the university. Then the university can hire better teaching staff, which in turn attracts better students, who donate more… The more talented also accumulate more power after graduating, in government institutions for example, which they can use (legally or not) to benefit their alma mater. Predicting this, again many people want to go there, and in the stiff competition the best get in.
5) If the employers believe that from some place, more intelligent people come than from elsewhere, then they are ready to make better offers to those coming from there. This makes the place attractive to all future employee candidates. Due to competition, the best get in, which justifies the belief of the employers.
6) Smarter people can be taught faster, at a pace that the stupider cannot keep. This mechanism gives everyone a motive to go to a school corresponding to their level.
7) Faster teaching means more knowledge during a standard length higher education, which the employers should value. The graduates of a school giving more knowledge are favoured, which makes the place attractive to everyone and leads to only the best getting in. The ability of the average student remains high, which enables faster teaching.

Sexual signals are similar to money

Ronald Fisher analyzed signalling in biology through traits that do not confer direct fitness advantage (higher survival or fecundity), but are desired by the opposite sex. This attraction is an equilibrium in a coordination game – if a potential mate has traits desired by the opposite sex, then the offspring with that mate are likely to have these traits as well and succeed in attracting the opposite sex. The traits confer a mating advantage, which is part of a fitness advantage, justifying the desirability of the traits.
It is a coordination game, because in a different equilibrium, traits without a direct fitness advantage are not desired. Then these traits do not give a mating advantage to the offspring and therefore do not have an indirect fitness advantage either. Then it is not fitness-enhancing to desire them. In summary, if a trait is expected to be desirable in the future, then it is desirable now, and if a trait is expected to be neutral or undesirable, then it is neutral or undesirable now.
Fiat money is inherently worthless, but in one equilibrium of the money game, has positive value in terms of other goods. If everyone expects that others will accept money in return for goods in the future, then it is useful to obtain money now. So everyone is happy to deliver goods in return for (a sufficient sum of) money now. The money game is a coordination game, because if everyone expects money not to be accepted in the future, then they do not give goods for money now. If money is expected to be worthless, then it is worthless, and if money is expected to be valuable, then it is valuable.
An overview of signalling in biology is at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Signalling_theory and Fisher’s theory at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fisherian_runaway
The coordination game of money is studied by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1993): http://www.jstor.org/stable/1832197 http://www.jstor.org/stable/2117496 and more simply explained in van der Lecq “Money, coordination and prices” https://books.google.com.au/books?id=r1r40SB0Wn8C&pg=PA29&lpg=PA29&dq=fiat+money+coordination&source=bl&ots=iI0M96m-qz&sig=lRHBAWIXYZs2V5S-iNFeH-2yar8&hl=et&sa=X&ei=d3lqVeneJ8TvmAX4vIGgDg&ved=0CEoQ6AEwBw#v=onepage&q=fiat%20money%20coordination&f=false

Eliminating for-profit academic publishing

Much has been written about the high profits academic publishers get from the volunteer labour of their referees and editors, and how high subscription costs reduce funds available for actual research. The opinion pieces and blog posts I have seen do not suggest a concrete way to change the system. They only express hope that with more researchers putting their work on the web, the for-profit publishing industry will eventually disappear. I think this disappearance can and should be hastened. The obvious way is to boycott for-profit journals as an author, referee, editor and librarian.
The obvious objection is that one’s career depends on publishing in certain journals that often happen to be for-profit, and that “service to the profession” (refereeing and editing) is one’s duty and also helps the career a bit. A moral counterargument is that while boycotting may impose some personal costs, it benefits other researchers and the increase in research benefits everyone, so as a favour to the rest of humanity, boycott is the right thing. After all, why do people become academic researchers when the private sector pays more?
Game theoretically, the academic system (including publishing) is a coordination game, like many social norms. As long as everyone else conforms to the system, it is costly to depart from it. Thus self-interested people choose to conform to the system. This keeps the system stable. Individual deviations are costly, but a collective (coalitional) deviation may be costless or at least cheaper. An example is the whole editorial board of a for-profit journal deciding to resign and start a nonprofit copy of this journal. They announce publicly that all articles that researchers were planning to submit to the for-profit journal should now be submitted to the nonprofit copy. The refereeing and editing process goes on as before, only the library subscriptions to the new journal are cheaper. There should be no loss of prestige for the editors or loss of publishing opportunity for the authors.
A journal is not complicated – it only requires an online system to let authors upload relatively small text files, let the editors forward these files (with author identity removed) to referees, referees to upload their text files and the editors to forward these (deidentified) files to authors. Such programs surely exist, free and open-source as well.
Perhaps a proofreader could be hired for the journal and paid out of subscription fees. But the total cost of running a journal (with volunteer labour like now) is very low.