Tag Archives: work

Less inspiring people in universities than in early school

A student claimed that fewer inspiring people are found in universities than in early school. Empirical checks of this would be interesting and would need a measure of inspiringness. A theoretical explanation is a tradeoff between multiple dimensions: subject matter competence, integrity, reliability, communication skills, being inspiring, etc. The tradeoff is on both the demand and the supply side. An inspiring competent person has many career options (CEO, politician, entrepreneur) besides academia, so fewer such people end up supplying their labour to the education sector.

On the demand side, a university has to prioritise dimensions on which to rank candidates and hire, given its salary budget and capacity constraints on how many job positions it has. Weighting competence more leaves less emphasis on inspiringness. Competing universities may prioritise different dimensions (be horizontally differentiated), in which case on average each institution gets candidates who have more of its preferred dimension and less of other dimensions.

As a side note, what an organisation says its priorities are may differ from its actual priorities, which are evidenced by behaviour, e.g., who it hires. It may say it values teaching with passion, but hire based on research success instead.

A constraint is a special case of a tradeoff. Suppose that given the minimum required competence, an employer wants to hire the most inspiring person. The higher this level of competence (teaching PhD courses vs kindergarten), the fewer people satisfy the constraint. At a high enough level of the constraint, there may be insufficient candidates in the world to fill all the vacant jobs. Some employers cannot fill the position, others will have just one candidate. Maximising inspiringness over an empty set, or a set of one, is unlikely to yield very inspiring people.

It may be inherently simpler to inspire with easier material, in which case even with equally inspiring people throughout all levels of education, the later stages will seem less inspiring.

Larger leaps through theory may be required as a subject gets more advanced, leaving less scope for inspiring anecdotes and real-life examples. The ivory tower is often accused of being out of touch with common experience. Parting with everyday life is partly inevitable for developing any specialised skill, otherwise the skill would be an everyday one, not specialised.

If inspiring people requires manipulating them, and more educated individuals resist manipulation better, then inspiring people gets more difficult with each level of education. Each stage of study selects on average the more intelligent graduates of the previous stage, so if smarter people are harder to manipulate, then those with higher levels of education are harder to inspire. On the other hand, if academics are naive and out of touch with the ways of the world, then they may be easier to manipulate and inspire than schoolchildren.

People accumulate interests and responsibilities in their first half of life. The more hobbies and duties, the less scope for adopting a goal proposed by some charismatic person, i.e., getting inspired by them. Later in life, many goals may have been achieved and people may have settled down for a comfortable existence. They are then less inclined to believe the need to follow a course that an inspiring person claims is a way of reaching their goals.

Identifying unmeasurable effort in contests

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To distinguish unmeasurable effort from unmeasurable exogenous factors like talent or environmental interference in contests, assumptions are needed, even for partial identification when overall performance can be objectively measured (e.g., chess move quality evaluated by a computer). Combining one of the following assumptions with the additive separability of effort and the exogenous factors provides sign restrictions on coefficient estimates. Additive separability means that talent or the environment changes performance the same way at any effort level.

One such identifying assumption is that effort is greatest when it makes the most difference – against an equal opponent. By contrast, effort is lower against much better and much worse opponents.

A similar identifying assumption is that if there is personal conflict between some contest participants but not others, then effort is likely higher against a hated opponent than a neutral one.

The performance of a given contestant against an equal opponent compared to against an unequal one is a lower bound on how much effort affects performance. Similarly, the performance against a hated rival compared to against a neutral contestant is a lower bound on the effect of effort. The lower bound is not the total influence of effort, because even against an unequal neutral opponent, effort is still positive.

Exercise is better than working to buy health insurance

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Health insurance does not insure health, but wealth. Exercising to prevent disease is often better than working to buy health insurance to cover treating that disease. For example, cancer, stroke and cardiovascular disease predominantly occur in old age, so insurance against these is highly substitutable with exercise.

The American Association for Critical Illness Insurance in 2011 listed the following average annual premiums by age group for a male nonsmoker based on a $40,000 benefit for treatment of cancer, stroke or heart attack. Age 40: $575 to $610; age 45: $745 to $785; age 50: $940 to $980. Similar premiums in 2019 only buy cancer insurance.

At an after-tax hourly wage of $20, paying these premiums requires 30-50 work hours per year, about 0.6-1 hour per week, or 0.6-1% of waking hours. From a baseline of zero sports, one hour per week of exercise increases lifespan by one year, or by about 1/80 of life expectancy. Whether switching an hour per week from work to exercise (and cutting health insurance to compensate for the lost hourly wage) is a good investment in terms of lifespan depends on how much treatment lengthens life and how much health insurance increases the probability or quality of treatment. Data is difficult to find on both the effect of treatment on lifespan and the effect of health insurance on treatment.

The median survival rate to hospital discharge after EMS-treated out-of-hospital cardiac arrest with any first recorded rhythm is 7.9%. So for serious heart conditions, treatment and thus health insurance does not make much difference. Lung cancer treatment is said to prolong survival by about three months, which also seems small. Even if no health insurance implies no treatment, which is not the case because emergency care is still provided, investing worktime to buy health insurance seems to have a low benefit. People with cancer survive with a probability about 2/3 of the survival probability of a comparable population without cancer, so the upper bound on the benefit of treatment is 2/3 times the probability of getting cancer times the remaining life expectancy. This upper bound is loose, because zero treatment does not reduce the 5-year survival probability to zero.

Affirmative action, unequal contests and incentives for effort

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Firms using affirmative action policies may perform better because of a welcoming work environment, better candidates, peer effects in diverse teams, but also because of stronger incentives that are targeted better. Unequal standards in contests, such as a lower bar for promotion for historically underrepresented groups, may motivate greater effort than equal ones. The reasoning is as follows.

If people expect to have unequal performance, then equal standards may demotivate everyone, because the high performers think the promotion or bonus is almost assured even without further effort, and the low performers believe the prize is unattainable, so no point in trying. In this case, setting a higher bar for the better-performing group can incentivise both groups, like different divisions in sports. The result that equalising a contest motivates greater effort is fairly general in game theory. Contests may even motivate overprovision of effort relative to the socially efficient level.

A similar effort-increasing effect of unequal standards occurs even if the groups have equal performance, provided their preferences differ. For example, if men value winning a contest (for evolutionary or other reasons), then they exert greater effort in a competitive environment where some but not all can get promoted. If women care little about winning and focus on absolute compensation, then promoting all of them does not significantly reduce their work incentives. An employer who does not internalise the full cost of the employees’ effort wants them to overwork, thus in such an environment optimally sets a high bar for the promotion of men, but a low bar for women.

On the other hand, if there is a limited number of promotion slots, then it may be optimal to give all these to men, because this increases total effort in the firm the most, and use other compensation (salary, bonuses, flex-work) to motivate women.

The smartest professors need not admit the smartest students

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The smartest professors are likely the best at targeting admission offers to students who are the most useful for them. Other things equal, the intelligence of a student is beneficial, but there may be tradeoffs. The overall usefulness may be maximised by prioritising obedience (manipulability) over intelligence or hard work. It is an empirical question what the real admissions criteria are. Data on pre-admissions personality test results (which the admissions committee may or may not have) would allow measuring whether the admission probability increases in obedience. Measuring such effects for non-top universities is complicated by the strategic incentive to admit students who are reasonably likely to accept, i.e. unlikely to get a much better offer elsewhere. So the middle- and bottom-ranked universities might not offer a place to the highest-scoring students for reasons independent of the obedience-intelligence tradeoff.

Similarly, a firm does not necessarily hire the brightest and individually most productive workers, but rather those who the firm expects to contribute the most to the firm’s bottom line. Working well with colleagues, following orders and procedures may in some cases be the most important characteristics. A genius who is a maverick may disrupt other workers in the organisation too much, reducing overall productivity.

Directing help-seekers to resources is playing hot potato

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In several mental health first aid guidelines, one of the steps is to direct the help-seeker to resources (suggest asking friends, family, professionals for help, reading materials on how to cope with the mental condition). This can provide an excuse to play hot potato: send the help-seeker to someone else instead of providing help. For example, the therapist or counsellor suggests seeing a doctor and obtaining a prescription, and the doctor recommends meeting a therapist instead.

The hot potato game is neither limited to sufferers of mental health issues, nor to doctors and counsellors. It is very common in universities: many people „raise awareness”, „coordinate” the work of others or „mentor” them, „manage change”, „are on the team or committee”, „create an action plan” (or strategy, policy or procedure), „start a conversation” about an issue or „call attention” to it, instead of actually doing useful work. One example is extolling the virtues of recycling, as opposed to physically moving recyclable items from the garbage bin to the recycling bin, and non-recyclable waste in the other direction. Another example is calling attention to mental health, instead of volunteering to visit the mentally ill at home and help them with tasks. Talking about supporting and mentoring early career academics, as opposed to donating part of one’s salary to create a new postdoc position, thereby putting one’s money where one’s mouth is.

All the seeming-work activities mentioned above allow avoiding actual work and padding one’s CV. Claiming to manage and coordinate other people additionally helps with empire-building – hiring more subordinates to whom one’s own work can be outsourced.

To motivate people to do useful work, as opposed to coordinating or managing, the desirable outcomes of the work should be clearly defined, measured, and incentivised. Mere discussions, committee meetings and action plans should attract no rewards, rather the reverse, because these waste other people’s time. More generally, using more inputs for the same output should be penalised, for example for academics, receiving more grant money should count negatively for promotions, given the same patent and publication output.

One way to measure the usefulness of someone’s activity is to use the revealed preference of colleagues (https://sanderheinsalu.com/ajaveeb/?p=1093). Some management and coordination is beneficial, but universities tend to overdo it, so it has negative value added.

Identifying useful work in large organisations by revealed preference

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Some members of large organisations seemingly do work, but actually contribute negatively by wasting other people’s time. For example, by sending mass emails, adding regulations, changing things for the sake of changing them (and to pad their CV with „completed projects”) or blocking change with endless committees, consultations and discussions with stakeholders. Even if there is a small benefit from this pretend-work, it is outweighed by the cost to the organisation from the wasted hours of other members. It is difficult to distinguish such negative-value-added activity from positive contributions (being proactive and entrepreneurial, leading by example). Opinions differ on what initiatives are good or bad and how much communication or discussion is enough.
Asking others to rate the work of a person would be informative if the feedback was honest, but usually people do not want to officially criticise colleagues and are not motivated to respond thoughtfully to surveys. Selection bias is also a problem, as online ratings show – the people motivated enough to rate a product, service or person are more likely to have extreme opinions.
Modern technology offers a way to study the revealed preferences of all members of the organisation without taking any of their time. If most email recipients block a given sender, move her or his emails to junk or spend very little time reading (keeping the email open), then this suggests the emails are not particularly useful. Aggregate email activity can be tracked without violating privacy if no human sees information about any particular individual’s email filtering or junking, only about the total number of people ignoring a given sender.
Making meetings, consultations and discussions optional and providing an excuse not to attend (e.g. two voluntary meetings at the same time) similarly allows members of the organisation „vote with their feet” about which meeting they find (more) useful. This provides an honest signal, unlike politeness-constrained and time-consuming feedback.
Anonymity of surveys helps mitigate the reluctance to officially criticise colleagues, but people may not believe that anonymity will be preserved. Even with trust in the feedback mechanism, the time cost of responding may preclude serious and thoughtful answers.

Book-like screen arrangement

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Office computer screens are mostly kept in the landscape orientation, but are usually used for documents, which are in the portrait format. Modern screens can be rotated to portrait mode, which makes reading print-view documents easier, or at least allows a larger fraction of the document to be displayed. Taking this one step further, for markup languages (XML, LaTeX) or programming, it is often helpful to see both the code and the compiled output side by side. This may be displayed on one large split screen in landscape orientation or two vertically oriented screens in a book-like arrangement, as in the following image.

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Easier combining of entertainment and work may explain increased income inequality

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Many low-skill jobs (guard, driver, janitor, manual labourer) permit on-the-job consumption of forms of entertainment (listening to music or news, phoning friends) that became much cheaper and more available with the introduction of new electronic devices (first small radios, then TVs, then cellphones, smartphones). Such entertainment does not reduce productivity at the abovementioned jobs much, which is why it is allowed. On the other hand, many high-skill jobs (planning, communicating, performing surgery) are difficult to combine with any entertainment, because the distraction would decrease productivity significantly. The utility of low-skill work thus increased relatively more than that of skilled jobs when electronics spread and cheapened. The higher utility made low-skill jobs relatively more attractive, so the supply of labour at these increased relatively more. This supply rise reduced the pay relative to high-skill jobs, which increased income inequality. Another way to describe this mechanism is that as the disutility of low-skill jobs fell, so did the real wage required to compensate people for this disutility.

An empirically testable implication of this theory is that jobs of any skill level that do not allow on-the-job entertainment should have seen salaries increase more than comparable jobs which can be combined with listening to music or with personal phone calls. For example, a janitor cleaning an empty building can make personal calls, but a cleaner of a mall (or other public venue) during business hours may be more restricted. Both can listen to music on their headphones, so the salaries should not have diverged when small cassette players went mainstream, but should have diverged when cellphones with headsets became cheap. Similarly, a trucker or nightwatchman has more entertainment options than a taxi driver or mall security guard, because the latter do not want to annoy customers with personal calls or loud music. A call centre operator is more restricted from audiovisual entertainment than a receptionist.

According to the above theory, the introduction of radios and cellphones should have increased the wage inequality between areas with good and bad reception, for example between remote rural and urban regions, or between underground and aboveground mining. On the other hand, the introduction of recorded music should not have increased these inequalities as much, because the availability of records is more similar across regions than radio or phone coverage.